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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT I. CORNE, for and on behalf of himself and all stockholders of
HELIANCE NATIONAL LIFE
IXSCRANCE COl\IPANY, similarly situated,
Plaintiff and AppellanJ,
VS.

FHAXK B. SALISBURY,
Defendant and Respondent.
-----

)

Case No.
10814

ROBERT I. CORNE, for and on beblf of HELIAXCE X ATION AL
LIFE INSURANCE COl\IP ANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
FIL\XK B. SALISBURY,
Defendant and Respondent.,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATE)IENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed an action in the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County for and on behalf of himself, awl Reliance National Life Insurance Company
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and for and on behalf of all stockholders of said Com.
pany pursuant to Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to recover from defendant secret and unlawful
profits realized by defendant in the sale by defendant
of control of and over the said Reliance National Life
Insurance Company in violation of defendant's fiduciary
duties.
·
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY
THE LO,VER COURT
The lower court, Judge :Faux, in his "l\lemorandum Decision" of December 22, 1966 (R. 41) and his
"Judgment of Dismissal" on December 28 ,1966, (R.
42) granted defendant's "Motion to Dismiss or in the
Alternative to Strike." Plaintiff is appealing herein
from the said dismissal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

It is submitted in this appeal that the rulings of the

lower court granting defendant's l\Iotion to Dismiss.
should be reversed for error of law and the case remanded to the District Court with instructions to deny the
:Motion to Dismiss of defendant and require defendant
to answer or otherwise plead.
STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

The facts underlying the appeal may be readily
capsulized. Appellant filed an action in the United
2

States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Di,·ision on August 25, 1965, (Civil No. C-170 65),
(R. 50-395). In that Action, four other defendants
were named in addition to defendant Salisbury. Each
defendant, including defendant Salisbury, was personally served by a United States Marshal outside of
the State of Utah. Defendant Salisbury was served
at Phoenix, Arizona ( R. 82) .
The action of plaintiff Cohne (Appellant herein)
in the e nited States District Court was based on violation of federal securities statutes and regulations.
After several hearings, the United States District Court
granted plaintiff Colme the right to amend his Complaint and the Amended Complaint was filed on December 30, 1965. (R. 144-158). On March 7, 1966,
.T udge Christensen struck from plaintiff's pleadings
the phrase "or are pendent to claims arising under and
based solely thereon." (R. 148). It was to the Amended
Complaint in the United States District Court with
the aforesaid language stricken by order of the Court,
that defendants therein filed motions to dismiss. At no
time did rtn.lf of the defendants in that action enter a
;1e11eral appearance and each defendant in every pleadinr; carefully appeared specially solely to contest jurisdiction. On July 6, 1966, Judge Christensen entered
his ":\Iemorandum Decision" dismissing plaintiff's
Amended Complaint (R. 386-388) on the grounds of
failure of jurisdiction in the said United States District
Court action.
Subsequent to the dismissal of the United States
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District Court action, which said action was based solely
on federal statutes and wherein extraterritorial service
was sought under express federal statutory authorization, l\Ir. Cohne, Appellant herein, filed an action in
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, and obtained personal service upon Mr.
Salisbury at Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 9-11.) Defendant-Respondent filed a ".Motion to Dismiss or in
the Alternative to Strike" on September 26, 1966. (R.
38-39.) The sole argument of Defendant-Respondent
herein in support of his motion to dismiss heard by the
lower court on October 17, 1966, was that the dismissal
of the federal court action somehow constituted a bar
to any action thereafter against defendant Salisbury.

ARGUlHENT
POINT I
THE CLAC\I OF PLAINTIFF CORNE IN
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT ACTION (CIVIL
NO. C-170-65 JAROSE FROl\I CONDUCT OF
DEFENDANTS THEREIN (INCLUDING DE·
FENDANT SALISBURY) VIOLATIVE OF
FEDERAL LA ,V. THE ELEMENTS OF CIVIL
LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL RULE IOb5 ARE NOT THE SAl\IE AS COI\-Il\10N LAW
FRAUD OR DECEIT.
The action of Plaintiff Cohne (Appellant herein)
in federal court was based solely on alleged violation of
4

Section 10 ( b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. Section 78j )and Rule lOb-5 (17 C.:F.R.
;2-iO.lOb-5) promulgated by the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission pursuant to authority of
the Exchange Act.
Rule IOb-5 reads:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange, ( 1) to employ any device, scheme or
artifice to defraud, ( 2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading,
or (3) to engage in any act, practice or course
of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security."

Each of the Circuit Courts which has considered
IOb-5 ciYil liability has found that claims such as pleaded
by plaintiff in the instant case, would lie. (See cases
collected by Loss, Securities Regulation (2d Ed. 1961)
Yol. Ill at page 1763). But no court has treated the
matter more definitively than the Ninth Circuit in the
case of Ellis v. Carter, 291 F. 2d 270 (1961). In the
Ellis case the Court set forth at length the possible interpretations of the scope and requirements of lOb-5
ciYil liability. It acknowledges certain "anomalies"
and then states (at page 27 4) :
5

" ( 4) Appellees further argue that if we reaffirm Matheson [Matheson v. Armbrust, 284
:F. 2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960)} we should at least
hold that appellant mus~ allege and ultimately
prove genuine fraud, as distinct from 'a mere
misstatement or omission', to paraphrase the
language of subparagraph (2) of Rule lOb-5.
This is in effect, a challenge to the validity of
subparagraph ( 2) of the rule. It is predicated
on the idea that a proscription of material misstatements and half-truths without using fraud
or scienter language is not a permissible implementation of Section 10 (b). 'Ve msagree. Section IO ( b) speaks in terms of the use of 'any
manipulative device or contrivance' in contravention of rules and re,qulations as might be prescribed bJJ the Commission. It would have been
difficult to frame the authority to prescribe regulations in broader terms. Had Congress intended
to limit this authority to regulations proscribing
common-law fraud, it would probably have said
so. We see no reason to go beyond the plain meaning of the word 'anJJ', indicatin,g that the use of
manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances
of whatever kind maJJ be forbidden, to construe
the statute as if it read 'any fraudulent devices'."
(Emphasis added.)
Loss, supra, page 1435 says:
"The fact is that the courts have repeatedly
said that the fraud provisions in the SEC acts.
as well as the mail fraud statute, are not limited
to circumstances which would give rise to a common law action for deceit. (Citing cases.)"

In Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
6

Banker.~

Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (':V.D. Ky. 1960) the Court
said (at page 23):
"I am of the opinion that it was the intention
of the Congress by this legislation to give the
purchaser of invalid bonds a right to recover
without the necessity of offering proof of deceit
and intentional fraud. The statute contemplates
a new right of action for the good faith purchaser
to rl'Cot•er from the seller for constructive fraud
which grows out of the failure to make a full and
complete disclosure." (Emphasis added.)
The 1965 case of Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F. 2d 375
(10th Cir.) settled for this Circuit the question of·
whether a civil action arising under or based upon violation of the proscriptions of Rule IOb-5 required proof
of the elements of common law fraud or deceit. Stevens
originated in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, Central Division, and was tried to
Chief Judge 'Villis ,Y. Ritter. The appellant in that
case argued that an action based on Rule lOb-5 was
essentially the same as a common law fraud or deceit
action, that the plaintiff had failed to prove certain
elements of common law fraud and that, therefore, the
judgment for plaintiff should be reversed. In affirming
the trial court, the Circuit Court said (at page 379) :
"It is not necessary to allege or prove common
law fraud to make out a case under the statute
and rule. It is only necessary to prove one of
the prohibited actions such as the material misstatement of fact or the omission to state a material fact (citing) ."
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Professor Loss, the acknowledged authority in the
field says, concerning the elements of liability under
Rule lOb-5:
"Indeed, the plaintiff is not limited to proYin()'
an untrue statement or an omission but has re~
course to the possibly broader 'fraud' language
of the first and third clauses of the rule. (Citing.)
The other elements of common law deceit reliance, causation and scienter (citing) are not
mentioned . . . . " Loss, Securities Regulation,
( 1961), Vol. III at page l 765.
In the case of SEC t'. Cavital Gains llcscarc!i
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 11 L. Ed. 2d :237, 84 S. Ct.
275 (1963), the Supreme Court said (at 11 L. Ed.
237, at 246, footnote 39) :
" . . . It is to be noted that it is not necessary
that the person making the misrepresentatim{s
intend to cause loss to the other or gain a profit
for himself; it is only necessary that he intend
action in reliance on the truth of his misrepresentations. 1 Harper and James, the Law of
Torts (1956), 531".

POINT II
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COl_TRT
DISl\fISSED PLAINTIFF'S COl\f PLAINT IX
CIVIL NO. C-170-65, S 0 LE LY ON THE
GROUNDS OF FAILURE OF JURISDICTION.
Defendant Salisbury, Respondent herein, neyer
entered a general appearance in the United States Dis-
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trict Court action. In every stipulation to which defendant (Respondent) Salisbury was a party, he expressly
provided that execution of the stipulation should not
constitute a general appearance. See, for example,
Stipulation dated September 23, 1965 (R. 89-90);
Stipulation dated October 23, 1965, (R. 99-100); Stipulation dated November 18, 1965 (R. 127-128); Stipulation dated January 12, 1966, ( R. 162-163) : Stipulation dated February 3, 1966, (R. 204-205).
The sole and only question or issue raised by defendant (Respondent) Salisbury in the federal court
action was alleged failure of jurisdiction. See, for
example, ":Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction",
(R. 96-97) filed by defendant Salisbury on October
18, 1965, ".Memorandum of Defendant Frank B. Salisbury in support of .Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction" (R. 237-243) filed on April 1, 1966.
POINT III
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DID NOT HAYE PERSONAL JURISDICTIO~ OYER THE DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL
NO. C-170-65 EXCEPT AS TO CLAIMS BASED
SOLELY ON THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934.
In both the original Complaint (Paragraph 6, R.
60-61) and the Amended Complaint (Paragraph 4,
R. 147-148), jurisdiction in the United States District
Court action (Civil No. C-170-65) was based solely

9

upon Section 10 (h) of the Securities Act of 1934 (Section 78j of Title 15, U.S.C.A.) and Rule lOb-5 (Title
17, C.F.R., Section 240.lOb-5) promulgated by the
Dinted States Securities and Exchange Commission
thereunder.
All of the defendants in the federal Court action
were served personally outside of the State of Utah.
Defendant Salisbury was served by a U. S ..Marshal
at Phoenix, Arizona. (R. 82-84.) Section 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ( 15 U.S. C.A. Section 78aa) permits service upon a defendant beyond
the territorial limits of a United States District Court
in actions based upon violation of the federal statute or
regulations promulgated thereunder. The provision is
a radical departure from traditional concepts of due
process and jurisdiction and the Courts have tended to
strictly construe its applicability.
In a recent case, as in the case at bar, based on Rule
lOb-5, and wherein jurisdiction of the federal court
as to common law claims asserted to he pendent to the
federal statutory claims, Judge Doyle, United States
District Court Judge for the District of Colorado wrote:
"Englert's final argument challenges the
jurisdiction of this Court over his person. He was
served pursuant to the extraterritorial service of
process provision contained in Section 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act, and while he concedes
that this service was sufficient to obtain jurisdiction over his person with respect to the f e<leral
claims, he maintains that it was insufficient to
do so with respect to the claims based on the
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Kansas statute, i.e., the third claims of each complaint, Englert acknowledges that these state
claims, in accordance with Hurn v. Oursler (citing) are 'pendent' to the federal claims. However, he maintains that this doctrine applies
only with respect to jurisdiction of the subject
matter, and not jurisdiction of the person. The
authorities on this point are in conflict. (Citing.)"
Trussell, et al. v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,
et al., 236 F. Supp. 801, 803 (1964).
The Court said further (at page 804) :
"Undoubtedly, the issues underlying pendent
subject matter jurisdiction and pendent personal
jurisdiction are different. The fundamental issue
decided in Hurn v. Oursler, supra, was that
pendent subject matter jurisdiction was embraced within the scope of subject matter jurisdiction permitted by Article 3 of the United
States Constitution; it was there recognized that
Congress has conferred this jurisdiction upon
the federal courts. The question was whether
Congress had the power to do so . . . In any
event, after Hurn v. Oursler, there can be little
doubt that Congress has the power to allow
extraterritorial service of process with respect
to pendent state claims. The sole question is
whether Congress has provided for such service.
Congress has not provided explicitly for such
service, neither by the statute here in question,
Title 15, U.S.C. Section 78aa, nor has it done
so by rule. See Mississippi Publishing Corp.
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 66 S. Ct. 242, 90
L. Ed. 185 (1946). The question remains
whether it should be here implied. Sanction of
extraterritorial service has been implied, at least
once, from the terms of a federal statute, United
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States v. Congress Construction Co., 222 C.S.
199, 32 S. Ct. 44, 56 L. Ed. 163 ( 1911), Liinerick v. T. F. Scholes, Inc:., 10 Cir., 292 F. ~d
195 (1961). But the explicit limits of senice
of process historically have been meticulouslr
guarded. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board.
268 U.S. 619, 45 S. Ct. 621, 69 L. Ed. llI9
( 1925), United States v. Rhoades, D.C. u
F.R.D. 373 ( 1953). These limits have been set
by the Congress. Jiost recently, Federal Rule\
of Civil Procedure, Rule 4 ( f) has been amended
to permit senice of process extraterritorialk
not to exceed one hundred miles from the pla~e
of trial. See the comment on this amendment
contained in the article by Ka plan (the reporter
to the Advisory Committee) , Federal Rub
Amendments, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 631 (196.J. 1.
It would appear that the statutory approach t''
service of process has been such as to discourage
implied extensions."
·
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POINT IY

A DEFENDANT l\lA Y BE LIABLE FOR
RECOYERY OF A PRE.MIUl\1 REALIZED IX
THE SALE OF CONTROL OF A CORPORA· ,
TION, BUT SUCH A CLAI:\1 .MAY NOT BE
BASED ON RL'LE lOb-5.

This matter was settled by the United States Cir· ,
cuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the
companion cases of Birnbaum v. United States Steel,
193 F. 2d 461 (2d Cir., 19.52) and Perlman z·. Feldmann, 219 F. 2d 173 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 349 C'.S.
9.52 (1955). In the Birnhaum case, the Court of Ap-
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peals for the Second Circuit held that recovery for
sale of corporate control was not actionable under Rule
1ob-5 and the same Court held in Perlrnan that the same
facts did constitute a common law cause of action. (See
78 Harv. L. Rev. 505, Jan. 1965).
The argument of Plaintiff (Appellant herein)
Cohne in the federal court action urged the Court to
distinguish the Birnbaum case and hold jurisdiction
\I as proper as to the recovery of the premium realized
by l\lr. Salis bury. ( R. 229-236). The federal Court did
not so hold, and granted the defendants' motions directed to-and solely to-jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
The question of the liability of defendant Salisbury,
Respondent herein, for selling control of Reliance National Life Insurance Company has never been litigated
and the Plaintiff-Appellant and the persons for whom
he brought this action, have never had their "day in
court". The United States District Court in Civil No.
C-170-65, first struck references to pendent claims
from the amended complaint and then determined that
jusidiction over the person of the defendant was not
present. The claims of plaintiff Cohne in the federal
action were based solely on federal statutes and the
ruling of the federal Court in no sense should be deemed
res judicata as to a state court common law action.
Accordingly, the order of the lower court dismiss-
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ing the Complaint of Plaintiff-Appellant should be
reversed for error of law and the case remanded to the
District Court for trial.
Respectf uly submitted,
Adam M. Duncan
319 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Paul N. Cotro-Manes
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant.
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